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On the slide: The Margin Recovery Plan

Thank you. One decision today: whether this Board approves a three-year plan to rebuild our operating margin without closing a service line. The recommendation first, then the evidence, then your questions.

On the slide: Ridgeline can recover to a 3.2% operating margin by FY28 by fixing four operating problems, none of which requires closing a service line

Our recommendation is to approve the margin recovery plan: a three point two percent operating margin by fiscal twenty-eight, up from zero point six percent today, by fixing four operating problems. None of them requires closing a service line. Here is the logic. Margin fell three point two points in two years. Four causes explain three point six points of that fall, and the cost actions we have already taken recovered zero point four. The largest cause is contract labour, at nineteen point four percent of nursing spend against a peer median of seven point six. That costs us one point four points. Length of stay above the benchmark costs zero point nine. Rising claim denials cost zero point seven. And the shift toward Medicare Advantage, at materially lower realised rates, costs zero point six. Each problem has a workstream in the plan, and I will take them in turn.

On the slide: Operating margin fell from 3.8% to 0.6% in eight quarters: a $67M swing in operating income on flat volume

Start with where the margin went. Operating margin fell from three point eight percent to zero point six percent in eight quarters. On two point one billion dollars of net patient revenue, that is a sixty-seven million dollar swing in operating income. The number to hold on to is volume. Admissions grew one point two percent over the same period. Demand did not leave us. So this is a cost and realisation problem, not a demand problem, and that shapes the answer. We do not need to win back patients. We need to fix how we staff, discharge, bill and contract for the patients we already have.

On the slide: Four drivers account for 3.6 points of margin loss, and two of them are within management control within twelve months

Four drivers account for three point six points of margin loss, and two of them are within management control inside twelve months. Contract labour and claim denials are internal operating decisions. Both can move materially inside four quarters, without capital investment. Length of stay and payer mix are structural. Length of stay needs clinical redesign, and payer mix needs contracts renegotiated. Both are eighteen to thirty month efforts. That split is what shapes the plan. The two fast drivers come first, and the margin they return funds the two slow ones. I will take each driver in turn, starting with the largest.

On the slide: Contract labour is 19.4% of nursing spend against a peer median of 7.6%, costing $38M a year above benchmark

Contract labour is the largest single driver. It is nineteen point four percent of our nursing spend, against a regional peer median of seven point six. In the first quarter of fiscal twenty-three we were close to the peers, at six point one percent. The gap opened after that, and above benchmark it now costs us thirty-eight million dollars a year. The mechanism is simple. A contract nurse costs us two point four times a staff nurse, and our nursing vacancy rate reached thirty-one percent in the third quarter of fiscal twenty-five. Every vacancy we do not fill with our own staff, we fill at that premium. So the fix is not fewer nurses. It is filling the vacancies with our own.

On the slide: Length of stay exceeds the CMS benchmark, and the gap is widest where weekend discharge staffing was reduced in FY24

The second driver is length of stay. Most of our hospitals keep patients longer than the CMS benchmark of four point seven days, and the gap is widest at the sites where we reduced weekend discharge staffing in fiscal twenty-four. That was our own decision, and part of this gap follows from it. The prize for closing the gap is capacity as well as margin. Bringing all nine sites to benchmark releases one hundred and eighteen beds of daily capacity. That is the equivalent of a new one-hundred-bed facility, without building one. This is the driver that needs clinical redesign, so it is slower, and the plan gives it the time it needs.

On the slide: Initial denials rose to 13.1% while the overturn rate fell to 41%: the two moving in opposite directions is the real signal

The third driver, claim denials, is where the real signal is, because two numbers moved in opposite directions. Initial denials rose from seven point nine percent to thirteen point one percent in two years, concentrated in prior authorisation and medical necessity. Over the same period, the share of denials we overturn on appeal fell from sixty-four percent to forty-one percent. More claims are denied, and we win back fewer of them. The second number is ours. The fiscal twenty-four cost programme cut the appeals team by thirty percent. Part of this margin loss was self-inflicted, and that is also why it is fast to reverse. Rebuilding the team and moving authorisation to the front end are decisions inside our control.

On the slide: Medicare Advantage grew from 19% to 34% of volume in four years, and is forecast to reach 41% by FY28 on current contracts

The fourth driver is payer mix, and it sets the ceiling on the plan. Medicare Advantage grew from nineteen percent of our volume to thirty-four percent in four years, and on current contracts it reaches forty-one percent by fiscal twenty-eight. Medicare Advantage realises twelve percent less than commercial for the same DRG, before the administrative cost of prior authorisation. So every point of mix that shifts toward it costs us margin. The lever is timing. Four of our six largest Medicare Advantage contracts renew in fiscal twenty-seven. That negotiation is the single largest lever we have on realised rate, and it is why one of today’s approvals is a negotiating mandate.

On the slide: Four workstreams, sequenced so the two fastest fund the two slowest

The plan has four workstreams, sequenced so the two fastest fund the two slowest. Labour normalisation runs through fiscal twenty-six: an internal float pool, a retention package, and a cap on contract labour by unit. It is worth one point one points. Denials prevention starts at the same time and runs to the middle of fiscal twenty-seven: front-end authorisation, a rebuilt appeals team and payer scorecards, worth zero point five. Care progression starts in the second half of fiscal twenty-six: daily discharge huddles, weekend staffing restored and length-of-stay dashboards, worth zero point seven. Payer contracting runs from fiscal twenty-seven into fiscal twenty-eight: the Medicare Advantage renegotiation, rate floors and a network participation review, worth zero point three. Together, two point six points.

On the slide: The four workstreams bridge 0.6% to 3.2% by FY28: $55M of recurring operating income against $9M of one-time investment

Here is what those two point six points are worth. The four workstreams take operating margin from zero point six percent today to three point two percent by fiscal twenty-eight. On two point one billion dollars of revenue, two point six points is fifty-five million dollars of recurring operating income, every year. The investment to get there is nine million dollars, one time, and on the plan’s timing it pays back in fourteen months. Labour normalisation carries the largest share, one point one points, and it lands first. Denials prevention adds zero point five, care progression zero point seven, and payer contracting the last zero point three. Note what is not in this bridge. There is no service-line closure and no cut to a clinical post. Every point comes from how we operate. The figure this Board should test first is the labour run-rate, and the roadmap puts that test in front of you first.

On the slide: Labour and denials land in year one, funding the clinical and contracting work that carries the back half of the plan

The roadmap follows that sequence. Labour and denials land in year one, and the margin they return funds the clinical and contracting work that carries the back half of the plan. The Board keeps control at three checkpoints. In the second quarter of fiscal twenty-six, you see the labour run-rate, the first evidence that the plan is working. In the first quarter of fiscal twenty-seven, you give the mandate for the Medicare Advantage negotiation, ahead of the renewals. In the fourth quarter of fiscal twenty-seven, you review the full plan. Three checkpoints, each tied to a result you can measure.

On the slide: We are asking the Board to approve $9M of one-time investment to recover $55M of recurring margin

So the decision we are asking for is this: approve nine million dollars of one-time investment to recover fifty-five million dollars of recurring margin. Three approvals carry it. First, approve the nine million dollar envelope, for the float pool, the appeals team rebuild and the length-of-stay analytics platform, phased across fiscal twenty-six and twenty-seven. Second, mandate the Medicare Advantage renegotiation, including the authority to walk away from contracts below the rate floor, ahead of the fiscal twenty-seven renewal window. Third, accept the fiscal twenty-six margin guidance: margin holds near one point one percent while the investment lands, before the step up in fiscal twenty-seven. Management reports the labour run-rate to you at the first checkpoint, in the second quarter of fiscal twenty-six. We are asking for all three approvals today.

On the slide: Pantrio

I am Lena Varga, chief executive of Pantrio. We are raising eight million dollars, and one number defines the opportunity: Pantrio saves a restaurant six dollars for every dollar it costs.

On the slide: Independent restaurants throw away 11% of the food they buy, because they order from memory

Independent restaurants throw away eleven percent of the food they buy. We measured it in three hundred and ten restaurants before they started on Pantrio. At the average site that is one thousand five hundred and ninety-five dollars a month, on fourteen and a half thousand dollars of food purchases. It is how the order gets written: from memory, at closing time, by a tired chef. The till knows every dish that was sold, but the order never sees it. And the waste only shows up in the monthly food-cost line, a month too late to change the next order. That is the gap Pantrio closes, between what a restaurant sells and what it buys.

On the slide: Pantrio forecasts each day’s covers and builds the order, cutting waste from 11.0% to 3.1% within 90 days

Pantrio forecasts each day’s covers and builds the order. It reads sales by dish from the point-of-sale system, forecasts the coming days from sales history, bookings and weather, and sends the order to the distributor for the chef to approve in one tap. In the same three hundred and ten restaurants, waste fell from eleven percent to three point one percent within ninety days. That is one thousand one hundred and forty-five dollars saved every month, for a subscription of one hundred and ninety dollars. Six times its price, every month. That ratio is what the rest of this business is built on.

On the slide: Pantrio can serve a $217M market today, and win $26M of ARR from it within five years

The market Pantrio can serve today is two hundred and seventeen million dollars a year. That is the serviceable market: the ninety-five thousand restaurants in the forty metro areas our distributor integrations already cover, at two thousand two hundred and eighty dollars a year each. The total market, two hundred and eighty thousand independent restaurants, is six hundred and thirty-eight million. Our five-year target is twelve percent of the serviceable market: eleven thousand four hundred restaurants, or twenty-six million dollars of annual recurring revenue. The restaurant counts are our own estimates, built from distributor account data.

On the slide: At $190 a month, each restaurant returns $10,600 of gross profit against $1,900 to win it

Each restaurant is a good unit of business. At one hundred and ninety dollars a month and a seventy-eight percent gross margin, a restaurant earns us one hundred and forty-eight dollars of gross profit a month. It costs one thousand nine hundred dollars to win, blended across our channels, so we earn that back in twelve point eight months. With one point four percent of restaurants cancelling each month, the average customer stays seventy-one months and returns about ten thousand six hundred dollars of gross profit. That is five point six times what it cost to acquire.

On the slide: ARR tripled to $2.4M in twelve months, and existing customers spend 18% more each year

Annual recurring revenue tripled in twelve months, from eight hundred thousand dollars to two point four million. One thousand and fifty restaurants now pay us. Net revenue retention is one hundred and eighteen percent: the restaurants that were with us a year ago now pay eighteen percent more than they did then. And only one point four percent cancel in a month. So the base grows before we add a single new customer, and every new customer joins a base that is already expanding.

On the slide: Inventory apps count what is on the shelf; Pantrio is the only option built for one site that also places the order

The obvious question is why no one else does this. Restaurants today use one of three things. A spreadsheet and the distributor’s rep, which sends the order but forecasts nothing. Inventory-counting apps, which count what is on the shelf but neither forecast nor order. And enterprise suites, which forecast and order, but are sold to chains, with no plan a single restaurant can buy. Pantrio is the only option that forecasts, builds the order, sends it to the distributor and is priced for one site.

On the slide: Distributor partners win customers at a third of the cost of direct sales, and one partner brings 62% of them

Through distributor partners, a restaurant costs us one thousand one hundred dollars to acquire. Through direct sales, three thousand two hundred. Partners cost a third as much. And here is the risk you will ask about, so I will say it first. Sixty-two percent of our new restaurants in the last twelve months came through one distributor partner. That is too concentrated. The plan adds two distributor partners by month twelve, and brings the largest one below forty percent of new restaurants by month eighteen.

On the slide: The founders have run restaurant kitchens, built demand forecasts and built a distributor channel from zero

I spent eight years running operations for a fourteen-restaurant group, and I wrote the orders for every one of its kitchens. Tomás Reid, our chief technology officer, built the demand-forecasting system at a grocery delivery business. Hana Ito, our vice president of sales, built a distributor partner channel from zero to four hundred accounts at a restaurant-payments company. Between us we have done the three things this business needs: run the kitchen, build the forecast and build the channel.

On the slide: $8M funds 24 months and takes ARR from $2.4M to $7.5M, with half of it spent on winning restaurants

Here is what the eight million dollars does. Half, four million, goes to sales and marketing: winning restaurants. Two point four million goes to product and engineering, one point two million to distributor integrations, and four hundred thousand to general and administrative costs. With the one point nine million in the bank today, it funds twenty-four months at an average burn of four hundred and ten thousand dollars a month. At month twenty-four the plan is three thousand three hundred restaurants and seven point five million dollars of annual recurring revenue. Today we have six point one months of runway, which is why we are raising now.

On the slide: At 11,400 restaurants, Pantrio would prevent $157M a year of wasted food purchases

At eleven thousand four hundred restaurants, our five-year target, Pantrio would prevent one hundred and fifty-seven million dollars a year of wasted food purchases. Today we are raising eight million dollars in a priced Series A, and we are looking for a lead investor. Half of it goes to sales and marketing, thirty percent to product, fifteen percent to distributor integrations and five percent to general and administrative costs. The data room is open now, and partner meetings run through the twentieth of November. We would like yours to be one of them.

On the slide: Kinloch Fitness: Q3 results against plan, and the decisions we need

Thank you. One sentence on the quarter: revenue finished six hundred thousand dollars below plan, churn is red at three point nine percent, and I need two decisions from this committee before we leave the room.

On the slide: Q3 revenue was $0.6M below plan because churn rose to 3.9%, and the flex contract caused most of the rise

Here is the status, red items first. Members and churn are red. We ended the quarter with one hundred and twenty-one thousand four hundred members, against one hundred and twenty-six thousand planned, and monthly churn ran at three point nine percent against three point two. Revenue and EBITDA are amber. Revenue was thirty-three point nine million dollars against thirty-four point five, one point seven percent below plan, and EBITDA was six point zero million against six point nine. Two measures are green. We signed fourteen thousand six hundred new members, four percent above plan, and personal training revenue came in thirteen percent above plan. So the problem is not winning members. It is keeping them. The two decisions I will ask for today are about that: pausing the flex contract in nine gyms, and releasing four hundred thousand dollars to roll out small-group training.

On the slide: Four of six measures missed plan; the two that beat it are new joins and personal training

The scorecard puts the six measures side by side. Four missed plan and two beat it. Revenue was six hundred thousand dollars short. EBITDA was nine hundred thousand short. Members finished four thousand six hundred below plan, and churn was zero point seven points above it. The two that beat plan were new joins, up six hundred, and personal training revenue, up half a million dollars. Everything that depends on members staying is red or amber. Everything that depends on members joining, or buying more, is green.

On the slide: Lost membership dues cost $0.9M; personal training recovered $0.5M of it

Start with revenue. The six hundred thousand dollar shortfall has three parts. Lost membership dues cost nine hundred thousand: on average we had three thousand eight hundred fewer members than planned, at seventy-eight dollars a month, for three months. Personal training added five hundred thousand above plan. Retail and other income was two hundred thousand short. Thirty-four point five million, less nine hundred thousand, plus five hundred thousand, less two hundred thousand, gives thirty-three point nine million. So the whole revenue miss, and more, comes from dues.

On the slide: New joins beat plan by 4%, and small-group training lifted personal training revenue 13%

Before the miss, the two wins, because one of them is the second decision today. New joins beat plan by four percent: fourteen thousand six hundred against fourteen thousand. And personal training revenue came in at four point three million against three point eight, thirteen percent above plan. That gain came from small-group training, which we launched in twenty gyms in July. The other twenty-two gyms do not have it yet. That is the case for the four hundred thousand dollars I will ask for at the end.

On the slide: Churn in the nine flex-contract gyms ran at 6.1%, against 3.3% in the other 33

Now the miss. Churn in the nine gyms where we launched the flex contract ran at six point one percent a month. In the other thirty-three gyms it was three point three percent, close to the three point two in the plan. The flex contract, with no minimum term, launched in those nine gyms in May, and they hold twenty-one percent of our members. Put the two together, and the flex contract explains zero point six of the zero point seven point churn miss. This committee approved the flex contract in April. The data now says it brought in members who leave, and it is the main reason this quarter is red.

On the slide: Four actions, each with an owner and a date, bring churn back to plan by December

Four actions, each with an owner and a date. First, the Head of Membership pauses flex-contract sales in the nine gyms from the first of November, so new members join on twelve-month terms again. Second, from the same date, the Head of Member Services calls every flex member in their second month, to reach them before they cancel. Third, the Head of Fitness takes small-group training to the other twenty-two gyms by the thirty-first of March. And fourth, the Finance Director re-forecasts the fourth quarter with the pause built in, by the twenty-first of October. Together, these four actions are designed to bring churn back to plan by December.

On the slide: Three risks could keep churn above plan in Q4; each has a signal we will watch weekly

Three risks could keep churn above plan in the fourth quarter, and each has a signal we will watch every week. Members already on flex terms can still leave in any month, so we watch weekly cancellations in the nine gyms. January carries the year for new joins, and the pause takes the flex offer out of January marketing, so we watch December web enquiries against last year. And the training roll-out needs coaches hired in twenty-two gyms before March, so we track hiring against the plan.

On the slide: Two decisions from this committee, today, to bring churn back to plan

So, two decisions from this committee, today. First, pause the flex contract: stop selling it in the nine gyms from the first of November, while existing flex members keep their terms. The Head of Membership owns it. Second, release four hundred thousand dollars for coaches and equipment to take small-group training to the other twenty-two gyms by the thirty-first of March. The Head of Fitness owns it. With both approved, I will report progress on churn and on the roll-out at the fourth-quarter review. Do we have approval for both?

On the slide: Recovering $895K a year from Halden’s accounts payable

Thank you both. Your accounts payable data shows eight hundred and ninety-five thousand dollars a year that Halden can recover. The next six minutes show where it comes from, and what it takes.

On the slide: Halden pays $11.80 to process each invoice, four times the $2.90 our customers average

Start with your own numbers. Halden processes thirty-eight thousand supplier invoices a year, and each one costs eleven dollars and eighty cents to process, fully loaded. Our manufacturing customers average two dollars and ninety cents. That is four times the cost, on every invoice. Three things drive it. A team of seven clerks keys every invoice by hand. Forty-one percent of invoices still arrive on paper, and are scanned, typed and filed before anyone can approve them. And invoices are paid on day thirty-eight on average, past the ten-day window on every early-payment discount your suppliers offer. That third point is where most of the money is.

On the slide: Doing nothing costs Halden $895K a year, and 62% of it is discounts missed and penalties paid

Doing nothing costs Halden eight hundred and ninety-five thousand dollars a year, and sixty-two percent of it is discounts missed and penalties paid. Processing above our customer median costs three hundred and thirty-eight thousand: thirty-eight thousand invoices at eight dollars and ninety cents more than they need to cost. Missed early-payment discounts cost three hundred and sixty-eight thousand: two percent on twenty-three million dollars of discount-eligible spend, with eighty percent of it captured, not all of it. And late-payment penalties cost one hundred and eighty-nine thousand: ninety percent of last year’s two hundred and ten thousand. We used eighty and ninety percent rather than a hundred because of the paper.

On the slide: Paytrellis captures every invoice, matches it to the order and the receipt, and sends your team only the exceptions

Paytrellis does three things. It captures every invoice: paper is scanned in your mailroom, and email and PDF invoices are read on arrival, so nothing is keyed. It matches each invoice against its purchase order and goods receipt, the three-way match, and routes anything that does not match to the clerk who owns that supplier. And it pays on time: matched invoices go to your controllers for approval and are paid on the discount date. For your team, that means they work only the invoices that do not match, instead of keying all thirty-eight thousand.

On the slide: An invoice moves from receipt to payment in 9 days instead of 38, inside every 10-day discount window

Here is what that does to time. An invoice is received on day zero, captured on day one, matched on day two, approved by your controllers between days three and seven, and paid on day nine. Today it is paid on day thirty-eight. Day nine sits inside every ten-day discount window, so the two percent is taken on every eligible invoice that matches. That is the mechanism behind the three hundred and sixty-eight thousand dollars on the previous slide.

On the slide: A 1,200-employee frozen-foods manufacturer cut its cost per invoice from $12.40 to $3.10 in seven months

You do not have to take our word for it. A frozen-foods manufacturer with twelve hundred employees started where you are, at twelve dollars and forty cents an invoice. Seven months after signing, it was at three dollars and ten cents, seventy-five percent lower. In its first year it took three hundred and ninety thousand dollars of early-payment discounts. Its finance director will take a call with you before you sign. The connector approach, the paper-heavy supplier base and the ninety-day implementation are the same as in your case.

On the slide: $136K in year one returns $671K, and the investment pays back in month five

The commercials are simple. A ninety-six thousand dollar annual subscription and a forty thousand dollar implementation, one time: one hundred and thirty-six thousand dollars in year one. The savings start when you go live, after ninety days, at seventy-four thousand six hundred dollars a month. Over the nine months left in year one, that is six hundred and seventy-one thousand dollars. The investment pays back in month five, and the year-one return is three hundred and ninety-four percent.

On the slide: None of the four usual risks stops a 1 March go-live: your ERP, paper, control and cash

You will have four questions, so let me answer them now. Your ERP: we use a standard connector, tested in a two-week sandbox before go-live, with no custom code in your system. Paper: we scan it in your mailroom, and paper is exactly why the case assumes eighty percent discount capture rather than a hundred. Control: every approval stays with your controllers, with a full audit trail on each invoice. And cash: paying twenty-three million dollars of invoices twenty-eight days earlier ties up about one point eight million dollars. The two percent discount earns an annualised twenty-six percent on that cash, and your treasury team should confirm it against your cost of funds.

On the slide: Sign by 20 November and Halden goes live on 1 March 2027

So here is the next step. On the sixth of November, your IT lead and our solutions lead hold the technical workshop and test the connector plan. If it goes well, you sign the order form by the twentieth of November. Implementation starts on the first of December, and Halden goes live on the first of March, with savings from month four. Can we put the workshop in your IT lead’s diary today?

On the slide: A paid modelling course: who would buy it, and how many

Before you build an online course, you need to know one thing: how many people will actually buy it? In the next five minutes, you’ll see how to size that market, using one channel’s numbers.

On the slide: Launch the $149 course with a $79 student price: about 3,400 buyers and $407K in year one

Here’s the answer first. Our example is Sheetcraft, a YouTube channel that teaches spreadsheet skills. Its study says: launch a one hundred and forty-nine dollar course, with a seventy-nine dollar price for students. That’s about three thousand four hundred buyers, and four hundred and seven thousand dollars, in the first year. Remember those two numbers. Now let’s see where they come from.

On the slide: 96,000 people already watch Sheetcraft’s modelling videos; about 2,400 would buy a $149 course in year one

Start with the size of the market, in three steps. First, the total market: everyone who buys a course like this, about four hundred and ten thousand people a year. Second, the part Sheetcraft can actually reach. That’s the ninety-six thousand people who watched three or more of its modelling videos. Third, the share it can win in year one: two and a half percent, or about two thousand four hundred buyers.

On the slide: Students are the largest segment, at 44% of the audience, but only 12% of them would buy at $149

Next, split the audience into groups. That’s called segmenting. Sheetcraft surveyed its email list, and three groups came out. Students preparing for internships are the biggest, at forty-four percent. Then early-career analysts, at thirty-eight. Then small-business owners, at eighteen. Here’s the surprise. Only twelve percent of students would buy at one hundred and forty-nine dollars. For analysts, it’s forty-six percent. Groups that want different things often need different prices.

On the slide: Interest peaks from September to November, when students apply for internships, at 2.3 times the monthly average

Then look at timing. Views of modelling videos jump from September to November, when students apply for internships. In those three months, interest runs at two point three times the average. So a course that’s on sale by the first of September catches the whole peak. Launch in November, and you catch only a third of it. So when you launch is part of how much you sell.

On the slide: Between free videos and $400-plus professional training, no guided course sits at $79 to $149

Now, the competition. On one side, there are free YouTube videos. On the other, professional training, at four hundred dollars or more. In between, there’s a gap. No guided course for beginners sits at seventy-nine to one hundred and forty-nine dollars, with practice files and feedback on your model. That gap is where Sheetcraft’s course fits. Finding a gap like this is the whole point of looking at competitors.

On the slide: Of three ways to sell it, the self-paced course earns the most in year one, at $407K

There are three ways to sell it. Option A is a self-paced course: four hundred and seven thousand dollars in year one. Option B is a live cohort, capped at three hundred seats, so it tops out at about one hundred and twenty thousand. Option C is a monthly membership, at about two hundred and five thousand. Option A wins, because nothing caps how many people can buy.

On the slide: Launch the self-paced course on 1 September 2027 at $149, with a $79 price for students

So here’s the recommendation. Launch the self-paced course on the first of September, twenty twenty-seven. Price it at one hundred and forty-nine dollars, with seventy-nine for students. Why the student price? At one price, you’d make three hundred and sixty-one thousand dollars. With it, you make four hundred and seven thousand, and you get nine hundred and fifty-one more buyers. The student price brings the biggest group in.

On the slide: The riskiest number is how many ’very likely’ buyers actually buy; if it is half, year one is $203K

Every plan has a weak spot, so name it. Here, it’s this: how many people who say they’re very likely to buy actually do. The study assumes one in twelve. If it’s really one in twenty-four, year-one revenue halves, to about two hundred and three thousand dollars. There are two smaller risks: platform fees, and non-students using the student price. Naming a risk is how you plan for it.

On the slide: Test the riskiest number before building: pre-sell to the email list, with 150 pre-orders as the go line

So here’s the one thing to remember: test your riskiest number before you build anything. Sheetcraft’s next step is a two-week pre-sale to its twelve thousand four hundred email subscribers. Pre-orders are people paying before the course exists. If one hundred and fifty people pre-order, that’s the go signal. Try this on your own course idea. Thanks for watching, and I’ll see you in the next one.

On the slide: Tidewell Sense: leak detection that shuts the water off

Hi everyone, and thanks for joining. Most of what a leak costs you is time, and that’s the part you can control. In the next seven minutes: the numbers, the product, and a year of pilot results.

On the slide: In a 1,860-unit pilot portfolio, 23 leaks a year cost $423K, and 70% of them were found by a tenant

Let’s start with a real portfolio. Fourteen buildings, one thousand eight hundred and sixty apartments. In the year before our pilot, they had twenty-three leaks that caused real damage. By real damage, I mean more than a thousand dollars each. Together, those leaks cost four hundred and twenty-three thousand dollars. That’s an average of eighteen thousand four hundred dollars a leak. And here’s the part that stings. Sixteen of the twenty-three were found by a tenant, not by the building. That’s seventy percent. Think about how that happens. A washer hose gives way while the tenant is out. The water runs down to the units below. And the bill comes later: the repairs, rehousing people, and higher insurance premiums.

On the slide: The cost of a leak is set by how long nobody notices it: $2,900 if caught within an hour, $25,200 if a tenant finds it

When we looked closer at those twenty-three leaks, one thing explained the cost. Time. Seven of the leaks were caught within an hour. They cost two thousand nine hundred dollars each, on average. Sixteen were found by a tenant, usually hours later. They cost twenty-five thousand two hundred dollars each. That’s almost nine times as much. So here’s the insight we built the product on. Knowing about a leak isn’t enough. What matters is how fast the water stops. A sensor that beeps in an empty apartment doesn’t stop anything.

On the slide: Tidewell Sense puts a sensor at every water source and a shut-off valve on every unit’s supply

So here’s Tidewell Sense. It has three parts. First, sensors. They go under every sink, behind the washer and beside the water heater, and the battery lasts five years. Second, a shut-off valve. That’s a valve fitted on each apartment’s water supply, and it closes on its own the moment a sensor detects water. Third, the maintenance app. It alerts your on-call phone with the apartment and the exact spot, and it logs every event. And installation is quick. In the pilot, we fitted all one thousand eight hundred and sixty apartments in sixteen working days.

On the slide: Unlike sensors that only raise an alarm, Tidewell Sense stops the water, in a median of four minutes

So what makes it different? Most leak sensors raise an alarm. Tidewell Sense stops the water. In the pilot, the median time from the first drop to a closed valve was four minutes. The median is the middle value, so half of the events were faster than that. Every alert reaches a person, day or night, because it goes to the on-call phone, not to a beeper in an empty room. And it installs fast: sixteen days for the whole pilot, without opening a single wall.

On the slide: From the first drop to a closed valve in four minutes, with a person told at every step

Here’s what happens in those four minutes. At zero seconds, a sensor touches water. Within seconds, your on-call phone gets an alert with the apartment and the spot. At around four minutes, the apartment’s valve has closed on its own. And the next day, you get a log of the event for the repair and, if you need it, for your insurer. Now compare that with before the pilot. Back then, the median time just to discover a leak was nine and a half hours. Now it’s four minutes to water off.

On the slide: In twelve months, the pilot cut water-damage incidents from 23 to 6, and damage costs from $423K to $19K

So what did that do in the pilot year? Damaging leaks fell from twenty-three to six. That’s seventy-four percent fewer. And the damage cost fell from four hundred and twenty-three thousand dollars to about nineteen thousand. The six leaks that did cause damage were caught early, so they averaged three thousand one hundred dollars each. Put simply, the portfolio saved four hundred and four thousand six hundred dollars in a year.

On the slide: Humidity sensing, software integration and insurer reports arrive through 2027

And we’re not stopping there. Here’s what’s coming through twenty twenty-seven. In the first quarter, humidity sensing: the same sensors will flag damp before it becomes mould. In the second quarter, software integration: leak events will show up as work orders in your property management system. And in the third quarter, insurer reports: a quarterly summary of events and response times you can send to your insurer. All three are included in the subscription, at no extra cost. These are planned quarters, so we’ll confirm exact dates as they get closer.

On the slide: At $6 per unit per month, the pilot portfolio paid $134K for a year and saved $405K

Now, pricing. It’s six dollars per apartment per month. That includes the sensors, the valve and installation, on a thirty-six-month term, and the hardware stays yours to use. Let’s run the pilot numbers. One thousand eight hundred and sixty apartments, times six dollars, times twelve months, is one hundred and thirty-three thousand nine hundred and twenty dollars. The pilot saved four hundred and four thousand six hundred. So the return was three times the cost of the subscription in the first year. Return here just means what you save for every dollar you spend.

On the slide: Start a free 90-day trial in one of your buildings

Here’s the one thing to remember: the cost of a leak is time, and Tidewell Sense takes the time away. Your next step is simple. Start a free ninety-day trial in one of your buildings. Book a site survey, and we’ll survey the building within two weeks. We’ll install sensors and valves in up to one hundred and twenty apartments, free for the ninety days. And at the end, you’ll get a report of every event and response time in your own building. Book by the fifteenth of December, and installations start in January. Thanks for joining us, and stay on for the live demo.